This paper examines and compares the writings of prominent religious clerics and members of the Shi‘i community, each of whom participated in the rise of the Shi‘i Islamic movement since the late 1970s. Through an examination of intellectual writings, sermons, and speeches by both religious clerics and their followers, I show that the ideological views of a leader did not always determine the religious practices and orientations of his pious followers. I argue that political contexts, clerical positions within the religious milieu, communal interests, as well as the pragmatism of certain clerical authorities, more than any clear ideological project affected the intellectual differentiation and internal boundaries within the community of Islamic activists in the 1980s. In tackling the subject of research, I explore how religious scholars and activists dealt with key religious developments on the local and regional levels. I thereby analyze how the religious field in Lebanon dealt with the introduction of controversial topics like wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist) in the public sphere, from the viewpoint of both clerics and followers. In the first section, I focus on the works and positions of prominent clerics like Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, and other lower ranking clerics. They shared similar ideological projects, cultural discourses, and religious training in Najaf, Iraq, where they also witnessed an Islamic revival. These clerics returned to Lebanon and played a vital role in Islamic activism. I show why and how their views regarding wilayat al-faqih, and other revolutionary topics, evolved under the influence of the position that they occupied in the religious milieu, and due to pressures coming from the local context where they performed their religious roles. In the second section, I demonstrate that the followers of a local religious authority, like Fadlallah, did not always espouse his political views, especially when he changed them. Similarly, I show that activists who espoused the revolutionary views and ordinances of an eminent scholar, like Khomeini, did not necessarily adopt his political theories. To illustrate, evidence reveals that many activists still considered themselves part of the “Khomeinid awakening” until 1985, despite their disregard for wilayat al-faqih and its doctrinal output as a system of governance.