The success of democratic change is often predicated on the moderation of anti-systemic and extremist parties. For this reason, the rise to power of Islamic political forces in some of the countries that experienced the Arab Spring raised major concern among observers on whether the prospects of democracy in those countries were to be dashed by an imminent ‘Islamist winter’. Among the Islamist actors that attracted attention was the Brotherhood-inspired Ennahda party in Tunisia. In the ten years that followed the end of former dictator Ben Ali’s rule, the party was at the center of the country’s political landscape. Contrary to general apprehension though, the party did not threaten the country’s legacy as a rather secularized country in the Arab region. Instead, Ennahda displayed a governing strategy far from classic Islamist tenets and willingness to abide by democratic principles: instead of championing an Islamic state, it agreed to establish a civil state not bound by shariʿa law; instead of considering themselves the sole legitimate office holders, it was able to share power with secular political rivals; instead of suppressing women's rights, it has endeavored to improve them; and instead of adopting a comprehensive social approach in line with the din wa dawlah dogma, the party chose to specialize in politics. This study sought to find out the roots of Ennahda’s so-called ‘ideological moderation’, a term from the literature on party moderation that designates the move to accept democratic procedures, human rights, and a market economy. Expanding on the classic Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, which states that political openings first produce strategic behavioral change for actors willing to take advantage of a changing political opportunity structure and may or may not produce ideological moderation as a by-product, this study draws from the literature on political learning to show that Ennahda’s process of ideological moderation started well before inclusion in multiparty politics, therefore dismissing claims that its governing strategy was mere posturing. For the purpose of this study, face-to-face, phone and video in-depth interviews were carried out with about 80 individuals, including political figures from Ennahda and other political affiliations, journalists, intellectuals and civil society ativists, during 5-month fieldwork in the country. The methologies used were process tracing, discurse analysis, and open-ended interviews. The results of this investigation were partly incorporared into the author’s PhD dissertation.