What explains the ubiquitous emergence of political mobilization among middle class youth in the context of neo-liberalism and political authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)? And to what extent is the rise of youth organizations and popular protests linked to the fragmentation of what were, relatively cohesive and consolidated middle class-based Islamist social movements? Building on recent research conducted among youth-led organizations in Sudan, this paper examines two inter-related developments: the political and economic factors underlying the emergence of politically mobilized youth in the urban quarters of Khartoum, and what I term the increasing “disaffection” of middle class members of the Islamist movement engaged in contesting neo-liberal policies and authoritarian rule. At a general level of analysis, my paper argues that the relationship between neo-liberalism, the rise of youth movements, and the divisions within Islamist movements in MENA hinges on an analysis of factors long associated, albeit mistakenly, with the durability of Authoritarian regimes. These include the assumptions that Arab countries possess weak civil societies, have middle classes uniformly beholden to state patronage, and that opposition political organizations in the region are either too weak or simply non-existent. Indeed, while in a number of cases the path to democratization has stalled, it is also clear that the mobilization of the middle classes in civil society and variations in state response to street protests has crucially transformed the ideological character, organizational structure, and cohesiveness of youth politics as well as Islamist movements. Utilizing the case of Sudan, I argue that the new politics of youth requires an analysis that complements and challenges the literature on authoritarian “persistence” by focusing on both the enduring role of state coercion as well as the agency-driven response of social actors that have organized new forms of opposition to the implementation of economic austerity measures in the context of authoritarian rule. I demonstrate that the rise of youth politics is linked to a new political opportunity structured associated with divisions within the ruling Islamist Party and the disaffection among key segments of the Islamist oriented middle class with the regime’s ideological legitimacy and pro-market reform policies. However, the evolution and organization of the youth movement is crucially dependent on the nature of state coercion, as well as the perceived legitimacy of neo-liberal policies among less disaffected segments of the urban middle class.