While Al-Azhar shied away from supporting protesters on the eve of the January 25th Revolution, many of Egypt’s most prominent televangelists – such as Amr Khaled, Mustafa Hosni and Moez Masoud – were vocal in their support of thawrat al-shabab (the youth revolution). In Mubarak’s Egypt, these televangelists’ authority with their primarily youthful publics derived not from a mastery of the authoritative textual canon of the Islamic tradition a la Azharite scholars, but rather from their projected status as an “ordinary Muslims” struggling to lead an Islamically-correct life. They had authority not because they were different from the youth they preached to, but because they were just like them. Islamic televangelists capitalized on this source of authority in the weeks leading up to Mubarak’s resignation to reach out and lend their support to revolutionary youth. Indeed, many Islamic televangelists were eager to publicize their physical presence in Tahrir, a presence which was amplified a thousand-fold through its mediation on a variety of platforms, from satellite television to Facebook. Appearing on state television for the first time in his career, Amr Khaled told the program host that he “saw God in Tahrir.” Along with other televangelists, he framed Tahrir Square as an exemplar of a “New Egypt,” a utopian space of tolerant faith and positive action. Following the success of the revolution, televangelists called on youth to “build Egypt” (ibniy masr) with the ethos of Tahrir as a template. So far, such calls have not acquired a specifically Islamic content, but rather revolve around nationalist notions of good citizenship and neo-liberal notions of economic productivity. At the same time, the call to “build Egypt” articulates with the televangelical stress over the past decade on Muslim youth as agents of societal change (taghyeer igtimia’ii) and positive energy (taqaa mugeeba). Drawing on on-going fieldwork with Islamic televangelists in Egypt and an analysis of televangelical media and writings, this paper explores the assumptions about religion, nation and youth that inform televangelical framings of the January 25th Revolution. What does it mean to both be an exemplary Muslim and an exemplary Egyptian youth within televangelical discourse in post-Mubarak Egypt? What role do televangelists ascribe to (religious) media in shaping such subjects? What continuities and ruptures can be traced in Islamic televangelist discourses before and after the revolution with regards to both their own role and the role of youth in effecting change in Muslim societies?