Following the overthrow of Qaddafi, Libyan politicians pressured the new government into issuing a law to organize the political sphere and allow for establishment of political parties. The Transitional National Council issued law 29 in May of 2012. During the first general elections for the General National Congress (GNC) in July 2012, political parties were given the chance to run in the form of lists that would compose 40% of the GNC. The decision was made in attempt to ensure that parties participate but do not have the majority to hijack the congress. Some parties, however, directed their members to run as individuals, which composed the other 60% of GNC. The public mistakenly perceived individuals as "independents" and therefore was surprised as parties took over the GNC completely within few sessions. Considering the unstable situation and inefficient government performance between 2012 and 2014, the public largely blamed political parties, leading to pressure to ban parties from participating in the parliamentary elections in June of 2014. The sentiment continued with the ongoing reconciliation process and national dialogue. I argue that, contrary to public belief, political parties have been critical in preventing the spark of a civil war between 2012 and 2014, as they offered an alternative to strong tribal and regional affiliations that later came to control the Libyan political arena post summer 2014. For this paper, I utilize interviews with politicians, both independent and party figures, as well as government officials. I also compare the functioning mechanism of NTC, GNC, and HoR to evaluate the uniqueness provided by party participation. I review tensions between 2012 and 2014 and study the role of GNC, and especially party-affiliated members in resolving such issues. Comparing the performance of the GNC with its predecessor and successor will help understand the positive role that political parties played in containing tensions and introducing legislations.