This paper will explore how the Iraqi Baʿthist regime blended diplomacy with party ideology. Saddam Hussein's regime used Baʿthist ideology as a tool for its foreign policy objectives by seeking out those who supported or voiced praise for the Iraqi system. Accordingly, the Iraqi Baʿthists hoped to translate their version of Baʿthism onto those groups or states; ideology, therefore, served as means to obtain and sustain influence. This paper will explore Iraq’s efforts to export Baʿthist ideology into East Africa, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s. In the 1980s, Iraqi officials took interest in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, believing that an independent Eritrea would offer Baghdad better access to the Red Sea. Seeking to co-opt influential Eritreans, the Baʿthists deployed party resources to assist various student-led rebel factions. In the aftermath of the First Gulf War, the Iraqis sent military delegations to Sudan. The goal was to help the Sudanese Air Force reform its training and curriculum. Sudan supported Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, and he was eager to repay the courtesy. As this paper will show, these types of missions often either backfired on the Baʿthists or resulted in embarrassing on-the-ground performances. These initiatives struggled for generally two reasons. First, the Iraqis misjudged the realities of the environment in which they sought to operate. Second, Baghdad's lack of clear guidance and well-formulated strategy forced Iraqi operatives in the field to interpret shoddy policy, forcing them to offer up dubious explanations when results did not materialize. In Eritrea, the factional nature of the conflict left the Iraqis scrambling to understand who or what exactly they were supporting; in some cases, these rebel groups used the Iraqis for monetary means only while ignoring any ideological proposals. In Sudan, Iraqi military officials quickly found the situation to be almost beyond repair. The Sudanese Air Force lacked the parts, planes, and pilots to constitute an air force. In the end, the little that was achieved in Sudan was attributed to Baʿthist ideology. The struggles in Eritrea were blamed on the students' lack of ideological vigor. In this sense, Baʿthist ideology simultaneously exonerated Iraqi foreign policy when it failed and proved its merits when it succeeded. This paper will use Iraqi documents held in the Hizb al-Baʿth records and Conflict Records Research Center repository. It will provide further insight into the complexities and challenges of Iraqi foreign policy under the Baʿthist regime.