In line with a monograph I’m currently drafting, my presentation would examine the manner in which Zionism informed the formulation of Palestinian Arab national identity during the first decade of the British Mandate, in line with what I’ve argued elsewhere were by that point two different ideological conceptions of Arab national identity: the first corresponding to the European Romanticist model, wherein Arab national identity was understood largely as being rooted in a shared language, culture and history; the second, what I’ve referred to elsewhere as the salafi model, which stresses the relationship between the Arab people and Islam. During the early part of the twentieth century, Palestinian national identity (considered here as a subset of Arab national identity) was still in a formative stage and had the potential of finding correspondence with either model. My contention is that the centrality of Zionism to the Palestinian nationalist movement during the 1920s—at least up until the Wailing Wall disturbances of 1929—aligned more strongly with the secular model, mostly because Zionism defined Jews (i.e., Zionists) as a common enemy equally alien to both Muslims and Christians, significantly, in a manner that emphasized the latter’s commonalities—that is, what they shared (linguistically, culturally, historically, and even religiously, in the sense that both were equally not Jewish). Relevant here is that the British were perceived more as potential allies (i.e., who simply needed to be persuaded of the injustice of Zionism) than as enemies. This might be contrasted with the 1930s, by which time, Zionism came to be seen as a manifestation of British imperialism. Consequently, from that point forward, the Palestinian nationalist movement would be equally directed if not more so at the British. This development served to differentiate Muslims from Christians, including nationalistically, inasmuch as Christians were coreligionists of the “enemy.” In short, to the extent that the Palestinian nationalist movement defined itself as anti-British (that is, anti-European “Christian”), as opposed to simply anti-Zionist (that is, anti-Jewish), the more Palestinian Arab nationalist identity came to align with the salafi model. This shift was further augmented by the growing centrality to the nationalist struggle of the Haram al-Sharif and a perceived need to defend it, a perception, importantly, that was very actively promoted by the actions of certain political actors, most notably, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, in part, because doing so served to elevate his status among the nationalist leadership vis-à-vis his political rivals.