A growing body of scholarly and popular literature explores the strategic, diplomatic and economic relations between the People's Republic of China and the states of the Gulf. Almost all of these studies rest on the assumption that the PRC constitutes a serious rival, if not actually an active threat, to the major powers that enjoy well-established links to the region, namely the United States and the European Union. Most recent writing further assumes that it is Beijing that has taken the lead in expanding the range and depth of the PRC's activities in and around the Gulf. This paper challenges both preconceptions. It first surveys existing academic studies and journalistic accounts, and shows that they can be grouped into four primary lines of argument. It then situates the most commonly-advanced explanations for Beijing's dealings with the Arab Gulf states and Iran in the context of broader conceptual debates concerning Chinese foreign policy and the PRC's role in the contemporary world. Finally, it demonstrates that conventional views of China's policy toward the Gulf stand at variance with widely-accepted facts concerning events and trends in inter-regional affairs. Consequently, a more compelling explanation for the PRC's relations with the Gulf requires us to recognize that Beijing usually finds itself reacting to overtures and initiatives undertaken by governments in the region, rather than taking steps to overturn the status quo.