The 1999 election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika marked a turning point of Algerian antiterrorist strategy at the leadership level, a coronation of the shift from the “eradication strategy” to “National Reconciliation,” one based on “dialogue.” The strategy of national reconciliation, which departed from the ‘eradicator’ approach, characterized Bouteflika’s presidency. The national reconciliation policy helped him to gain wide legitimacy domestically and internationally. Furthermore, while this policy, which virtually grants amnesty to many of the militant Islamists who fought the regime during the civil strife, was meant to end within a year of its promulgation; however, this policy has remained in place and applied to terrorists who continue to surrender to the authorities. This paper will show that while the national reconciliation policy is indeed a milestone in Bouteflika’s rule, its precursor can be found in President Liamine Zeroual’s 1994 “Rahma Law” and in the September 1997 ceasefire between the authorities and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed branch of the Islamic Salvation Front. The paper will examine the context and the key elements of this strategy as well as its outcomes. One of the main conclusions is that while officially national reconciliation is still in place, as one of two opposing strategies since the mid-1990s, in practice, starting in 2013, due to a radical regional change (increased threats in the neighboring Sahel and the Libyan civil war), as well as a change in the structure and nature of the jihadi organizations in Algeria itself and abroad, there has been a shift back to the opposing (and failed) eradication policies of the early 1990s. The paper will also show that while there is a shift back to eradication in the fight against terrorism inside Algeria, the authorities have maintained and continue to promote the strategy of national reconciliation towards jihadist organizations across its southern borders and elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East. The study will draw from years of fieldwork in most countries of the Maghreb and the Sahel, including hundreds of interviews both with government leaders, security officials, analysts, and jihadist leaders and sympathizers, and will include a critique of standard texts on the topic (M. Löwi, H. Roberts, L. Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, V. Arnould). The study will make an important contribution to the field of counterterrorism strategy: the case of a government implementing opposing and oscillating strategies domestically and internationally, and abandoning the growing international consensus on human security.