While the Islamic Republic of Iran is commonly perceived by political actors to be a threatening force in world politics, the theoretical discussions which have influenced the formation and the evolution of the institutions of the Iranian government since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 have received little attention by political theorists. This paper is an exploration of the political theory of a scholar whose work set off a debate which continues today in Iran—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Specifically, it argues that although Khomeini’s theory has been characterized in much of the secondary literature as a theory of guardianship, this characterization obscures the sources of legitimacy and nature of Khomeini’s ideal government. To be sure, one aspect of political legitimacy, in Khomeini’s view, is the religious doctrine that prescribes the political leadership of a qualified guardian, but just as important to Khomeini’s political vision is an act of popular will which he says grants to the guardian the right to assume and continue to hold his position in government. And though a guardian must be featured in any legitimate government, prerogative is exercised by popularly-elected bodies within a sphere of political action made possible by the flexible nature and limited scope of Islamic law. Khomeini’s theory may thus be described as limited guardianship based on consent. This paper positions itself against two kinds of portrayals of Khomeini’s theory. On the one hand, it argues against scholars who hold that Khomeini’s theory left no room for popular sovereignty and prescribed absolute rule by a religious hierocracy to implement a monolithic and indisputable form of divine law. On the other hand, it argues against scholars who hold that Khomeini’s view was fundamentally incoherent, embracing notions of guardianship and popular rule that cannot accommodate one another. This paper works to overcome these two kinds of arguments by utilizing evidence from two sources—one, Khomeini’s most systematic formulation of his theory in a series of lectures to seminary students in Najaf in 1970, and secondly, Khomeini’s public speeches during the drafting of Iran’s first constitution. It argues that the latter set of writings communicates a view of government that is often more precise than, but yet fully consonant with, his 1970 lectures.