This research examines the relationship between the state and the border in Ottoman Hungary during the late sixteenth century and the Ottoman army’s ability to operate on the frontier despite the unique challenges posed by the region. This paper examines the ruzname of Mehmed III’s Eger campaign, Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic communications, and the chronicles of Ta’liki-zade and Mustafa Naima. By examining these sources, this paper seeks to build on the data gathered on the borderlands by other Ottomanists and how the empire was able manage its Hungarian provinces. This frontier in the late sixteenth century was dominated by lawlessness and the constant raids by both European and Ottoman subjects. These conditions came about as a result of the devolution of Ottoman state authority to the fortress garrisons and provincial governors, and the wide area of territory. The Long War resulted from a lack of control over border governors when Telli Hasan Pasha invaded Croatia in 1593, but was defeated by European forces. In Hungary proper, peasants often migrated out of Ottoman Hungary or remained and were harassed by their timar holders and the raiders from the Habsburg side of the border. At the same time, the Ottoman fortress garrisons provided employment for Balkan migrants who became soldiers within them and gained weapons and military training. These troops were not as effective as the state troops of the empire, however. These chaotic border conditions, and the larger instability in the empire, did not prevent the Ottoman army from winning at the sieges of Gyor (1594) and Eger (1596). While the timar cavalry system was becoming unsustainable due to the decrease in new land conquests, this did not hinder the army. The Ottomans were able to maintain their tactical edge with concentrated firepower, a functional logistical system, and large numbers of men. Military leaders on the periphery like Hasan Pasha could not muster the men and material the Ottoman state could, and fortress volunteers had a mixed record defending the empire’s defense network. Even though the timariot system was in need of reorganization and reform, this did not prevent the Ottoman army from winning against European opponents. The lack of significant conquests by the end of the Long War was not a sign of decline, but showed that the Ottoman army was able to defend the territorial integrity of the empire.