Most of the academic literature on republican political systems in the Arab world assumes that such systems are similar rather than different. Reviewing studies on Egypt and Syria reveal a case in point. As a general rule, scholars researching Syria cite Egypt as a harbinger for Syria's current trajectory. And they are not alone. During field research, Syrian political observers referred repeatedly to the Egyptian experience in order to explain developments in Syria while Egyptian analysts felt Syrian politics were following Egypt's lead. This paper, however, emphasizes the differences between them. In order to add to the comparative research agenda on Arab states, I examine the differing levels of institutional politicization and non-elite co-optation in Egypt and Syria. The degree to which institutions are politicized or depoliticized influences the way a regime co-opts non-elites into the system's services. For this study's purpose, non-elites are defined as educated and productive social actors that do not belong to the political elite. Non-elites also include independent political activists. The key factor is that these agents must be unaffiliated with the state's institutional structures. This paper documents non-elite co-optation as the process whereby such people are voluntarily tied to state institutions. Such structures can include ruling party committees or a national council for a particular issue. This paper's argument is that Egypt's depoliticized state institutions allow for more flexible non-elite co-optation. Because Egypt's governing institutions are centralized, the Egyptian government more easily co-opts potential rivals because there is less institutional competition. Hence, a central institution, in this case the ruling party, is where non-elite co-optation largely occurs. Conversely, the Syrian political arena contains several politicized institutions--particularly the presidency, the security services, and the B`ath party. As a result, the character of co-optation is less concentrated because politicized institutions compete for influence in bringing in outside non-elites. The paper contributes to the literature on comparative authoritarianism by comparing two political systems' structures and practices in the Arab world. To aid in the endeavor, I will make use of extensive interviews and field research conducted in Egypt and Syria between 2003-2006 as well as of primary documents. This paper also contributes to wider debates on contemporary Egyptian and Syrian politics as well as to non-elite politics and authoritarianism generally. The paper adds to the work by a larger group of scholars currently researching comparative authoritarianism.