This paper analyzes the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila Fi Libya (LIFG), which perpetrated attacks against the Libyan regime during the 1990s but has since 2008 undergone an ideological reversal, exceptional among Islamist movements. The leaders of the group have given up violence and reformed their ways by promoting a new ideology of dialogue and coexistence with the Libyan regime. This paper explores the chronological and ideological development of the LIFG reversal, exposes the changes in the group’s thought, and elucidates the causes of this change. The case of the LIFG is noteworthy as it provides insight into the ideological structure of radical Islamism on the whole, extending beyond Libya, and can provide predicative power. In addition, this paper discusses how Libya might have believed that closer relations to the United States could diminish other threats (such as the LIFG), conceivably threats more dangerous to Libya than the renunciation to its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Qaddafi even offered to cooperate with US officials in fighting al-Qaeda cells in the Maghreb well before the September 11, 2001 attacks. Libya has been at open war with al-Qaeda and its affiliates since at least 1996 after members of the LIFG participated in an attempt to assassinate Colonel Qaddafi. The Libyan regime accused al-Qaeda of having orchestrated and financed the LIFG coup attempt. By assigning blame to al-Qaeda, Qaddafi perhaps believed that he could assist in the US-led global war on terror (GWOT) and thereby create a normalized diplomatic relationship with the United States while diminishing the threat by the LIFG. Thus, WMD disarmament became a way to facilitate this normalization. Indeed, precisely one year after Qaddafi’s renouncement of WMD, in December 2004, the State Department listed the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. This paper will use analysis from Arabic media sources, and examine statements and speeches by both LIFG leaders and Libyan government.