The paradox arising out of a commitment to both absolute divine omnipotence and independent human agency has been intensively debated throughout Islamic intellectual history. Proposed solutions to the paradox have been articulated in a variety of conceptual frameworks, including Ash'ari theological formulations of divine creativity, Avicennan philosophical models of causality, and Akbari Sufi theories of the “oneness of being” (wahdat al-wujud). This paper focuses on the omnipotence-agency paradox as it is discussed by the eminent Persian theologian Jalal al-Din al-Dawani (d. 1502) in his Sharh al-'Aqa'id al-'Adudiyya, a commentary on the creedal manifesto of 'Adud al-Din al-Iji (d. 1356). Although this work is ostensibly meant to elucidate the fundamental doctrines of Ash'ari orthodoxy, Dawani’s treatment of the omnipotence-agency paradox engages with a multiplicity of competing philosophical-theological discourses. In this paper it is argued that Dawani attempts to resolve the omnipotence-agency paradox by reworking theses originating in the Avicennan philosophical tradition to be more amenable to Ash'ari theology, while also subtly introducing terminology and concepts derived from two controversial and notoriously antagonistic figures, Ibn 'Arabi (d. 1240) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). In Sharh al-'Aqa'id, Dawani either explicitly or implicitly appeals to all of these disparate epistemic fields in order to construct a novel solution to the omnipotence-agency paradox. This paper gives special attention to a distinction which Dawani draws between the divine existentiating command (al-amr al-takwini) and the divine legislating command (al-amr al-tashri'i). The immediate context for this distinction relates to a series of fatwas in which Ibn Taymiyya invokes al-amr al-takwini and al-amr al-tashri'i to argue against the theologians. However, the ultimate source of the distinction is found in Ibn 'Arabi’s Fusus al-hikam, a work with which both Ibn Taymiyya and Dawani were intimately familiar. For Ibn 'Arabi and the Akbari school, the distinction between al-amr al-takwini and al-amr al-tashri'i is closely related to the metaphysics of wahdat al-wujud. This paper thus reads Sharh al-'aqa'id alongside other works, including Risalat al-zawra' and al-Risala fi iman Fir'awn, in which Dawani explicitly defends Ibn 'Arabi and the Akbari metaphysics of wahdat al-wujud. By addressing the issue of intertextuality in Dawani’s treatment of the omnipotence-agency paradox, this paper problematizes the rigid categorization of a text which might otherwise be dismissed as a formulaic statement of creedal theology. In doing so, this paper also offers valuable insights into the practice of scholarly discourse during this understudied period of Islamic intellectual history.