In various shifting forms, Yemen has always been ruled using patronage networks and delegating functions of the state to non-state actors, be it tribal, religious or commercial elites. Since the establishment of modern-day borders, smuggling has become an important part of the patronage system as the state could use its limited enforcement powers to allow or disallow the involvement of particular actors in this profitable venture. As the reward was generated by the clients themselves in the form of profits from illicit trade, this method was especially suitable given the state’s limited resources. However, in order to be co-opted into the patronage network, the client needs to show control of a smuggling route or secure access to one. This paper investigates the role of land control and subsequent “ownership” of smuggling routes in the post-2011 Yemen both in the northern and southern provinces and illustrates the ways in which the fractured sovereignty in Yemen allows the continuous adjustment of the multi-faceted patronage system. Relying particularly on interviews, the changing nature of illicit trade in Yemen is analyzed and the resulting analysis shows why the fragmentation of spheres of influence and the re-shuffling of both physical and virtual smuggling routes and networks may be advantageous to power holders. By highlighting these relationships, the paper offers an explanation for the lack of progress in peace efforts and forms a contribution to the scholarly debates on illicit trade and politics of patronage.