Tunisia’s change of regime in 2011 created pressures and opportunities for political renewal not only at the national level, but at the local one as well. In the immediate aftermath of the regime fall, local councils were disbanded and, in many cases, interim councils established through impromptu measures. Subsequently, the special appointed councils, the Niyyabah Khousousiyya, were established in law, and a negotiation process between the governor and local leader to appoint members routinized. Despite the procedures, however, the experiences of council appointments varies dramatically: In some cases, they have been established relatively quickly with little contention, while in others, establishment has been thwarted and the process highly contested. This paper examines the reasons for the different experiences, and the relative impact that the very process itself appears to have on council performance. The paper draws from quantitative analysis of a dataset that includes council formation, council size, political affiliations of mayors, and other local socio-economic factors across all municipalities in Tunisia, drawn from the Official Journal. The paper is also based on qualitative interviews with council members, governors, local civil society activists, and other elites, conducted in 2013 and 2014 in 12 municipalities. The expectations, to be supported, refuted or revised through closer analysis of data currently conducted, is that although structural factors (e.g., the size of the council, the socio-economic status of the municipality) drive much of the variation in the timing and stability of local councils, political forces also play an important role. Longer negotiations over council formation may signal greater competition of political forces. Ironically, where such councils are formed, it may be the ones that take longer to form that actually perform better. Longer length to formation may signal the greater competition of political forces, and this may actually drive competition that incentivizes council members to perform better. The initial hypotheses underlying the second half of the paper is that councils formed through longer periods of contestation may have better performance. The inquiry not only yields a better understanding of council formation in Tunisia, but promises to shed light on local politics more generally as well. Understanding the interplay of national, governorate, and local levels is critical for considering the impact of decentralization. So, too, is a closer analysis of the political dynamics of local councils. This paper moves these inquiries forward.