Regime durability in the wake of a mass popular challenge is the result of multiple factors, including structural factors like regime type and economic resources, as well as the political strategies played by regime leaders. This paper focuses primarily on the effects of leadership strategies on regime durability in the Arab world by examining patterns of both repression and concession by Arab governments in the wake of the popular uprisings of 2011. The effects of both repression and concession on regime durability are tested using an original chronological data set of all major public concessions and repressive acts by Arab governments since the beginning of the Arab uprisings at the end of 2010 through early 2012. These data illustrate wide variation in the mix of repression and concession used by Arab governments, which are then correlated with variation in regime durability over time. I argue that there is evidence to suggest that dominantly repressive and dominantly concession-oriented strategies are more likely to lead to regime durability than playing a mixed strategy of both (simultaneous or alternating) repression and concession. This is illustrated by contrasting the effects of mixed vs. dominant strategies of repression or concession on temporal patterns of protest and regime change events. Mixed strategies that alternate repression and concession are directly associated with the collapse of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and to a lesser extent in Yemen (which did alternate strategies, but with heavier repression). If mixed strategies that alternate concession and repression lead to lower regime durability, then why are they used? I argue that there are two different reasons that regime leaders play mixed strategies, but that these strategies are unstable over time, leading to shifts away from mixed strategies towards either dominantly concession, or dominant repression strategies as time goes on. The first reason that leaders use both repression and concession is due to political uncertainty and poor information about the effects of these strategies on their opposition. A second reason that regimes use both strategies is because of divisions among decision makers, who may have different beliefs or preferences about whether to repress or concede. Hard-liners may make decisions favoring repression while soft-liners simultaneously send signals for dialogue or offer other concessions.