What accounts for the cross-sectarian, cross-class and cross-regional mobilization in Lebanon since October 2019? Why did this mass mobilization sustain itself compared to previous forms of mobilization that had taken shape over the past decade? While Lebanon had often captured the attention of the academic and policymaking circles from the lens of sectarianism and civil wars, this paper proposes a political economy of postwar Lebanon. I root the analysis of the 2019 October revolution in the contradictions and the limits of thirty years of neoliberal policies that have both served and been served by the sectarian postwar regime. The paper traces how the postwar neoliberal and sectarian order had produced accumulation by dispossession over time while keeping citizens divided along sectarian lines, depriving them from the most basic rights that make up a decent living and at the same time contributing to enrich bankers, big businessmen, and a corrupt sectarian political leadership. While this post-war order had been sustained for years by rents, it had run its course bringing about the seeds for the 2019 uprising. The paper will then embed the current October revolution in the history of cross-sectarian mass mobilization that had taken shape since 2010. I will argue that given the breadth of the current mass mobilization, its inter-class and cross regional character and the fact that it is aimed at both the political and economic elites makes it one of the most promising instances of a Gramscian « war of position ». The paper will then conclude with a reflection on the challenges that the current revolutionaries face as they struggle for negotiating a democratic and inclusive citizenship.