Corsairs in the seventeenth century tried to eliminate high risks related to their piratical operations by ascribing an institutional foundation to their activities and developing what we may call a “moral economy of violence.” They sought legitimacy under the shield of “holy war” and, at the same time, pursued an independent collectivism by standardizing their internal organizations, partnerships, and methods of communication. In that context, to reconcile two predominant and seemingly opposite views on piracy—one romanticizing pirate groups as devout warriors and the other relating piracy to self-indulgence and moral decline—this paper argues that corsairs’ observance of the political authority of the Ottoman central government did not necessarily contradict their economic interests and partnerships with the local elite (including European diplomat-merchants based in Tunisian ports). In that regard, two texts from the seventeenth century are examined: the first is a popular story, and the second is an epistolatory compendium from the Ottoman province of Tunis. The former is the narrative of a Warden Captain Mahmud, who is prudently willing to sacrifice material benefit for honour and integrity and embodies all the qualities of an ideal corsair: a competent sailor, an effective leader, and a source of inspiration for his crew. The second source, the letter collection, delineates the bureaucratic structure in the regency of Tunis as well as the place of corsair captains in it and includes, among its chapters, a code for corsairs which articulates established hierarchies and conventions of sharing rewards within a corsair crew.