The Muslim Brothers were major beneficiaries of the Egyptian government’s economic liberalization policies (infitah) beginning in 1974. Starting in that year Egypt became open to foreign and private investments and encouraged private enterprises. Even though scholars have analyzed this shift as overwhelmingly unproductive, benefiting crony capitalists by manipulating policies for the sake of maintaining power, they have underestimated how economic liberalization benefited businesses and businessmen of the opposition, particularly the Brotherhood and Islamist sympathizers. Most of the literature view the connection between economic liberalization and civil society in terms of the infitah leading to either a liberal political opening (as a trigger for social protest and activism) or creating a vacuum due to the dismantling of the welfare state, leaving space to be filled by the Muslim Brothers. Instead, I argue that the infitah produced openings for the Brothers and other Islamists and that they strategized and negotiated their gains and benefits. My argument is embedded in a larger literature on Middle Eastern authoritarianism as well as social movement theory. Most of the literature has turned away from the classic view that authoritarianism is rigid, inflexible, and does not change. Scholars have shown how the opposition successfully functions under such conditions, creating change within but not of authoritarianism, while mobilizing financial resources. It is within this environment, that the Brotherhood and other Islamist businessmen have functioned. Based on primary research, including personal interviews with Brotherhood members, Islamist businessmen and economists, I conclude that during the period of 1974-1995, the business environment in Egypt was far more beneficial to Islamists than is often assumed. In the literature, their freedom to do business is often conflated with their (lack of) freedom as political actors. As a result, the literature looks at crackdowns as total blows, rather than as targeted prunings. There was, in fact, a difference between Islamists as political and economic actors. While Islamists negotiated and strategized their activities as political actors, they also negotiated their economic activities and opportunities. Some 'survival strategies' included maintaining businesses under the negotiated ceiling, sustaining connections with state personnel, having a foreign connection for their businesses, and exploiting Brotherhood networks.