Since the dawn of industrialization, many authoritarian regimes have taken on massive public works projects which seem impressive or farfetched. Few onlookers are surprised when these projects are not completed or are completed at such a high cost that they appear to be an exercise in futility. Usually these failures are written off as dictatorial incompetence and overambition, but the initial motivations for beginning them are rarely addressed. This paper will call into question the 'failure' of these projects. More specifically, it will argue that, rather than being a symptom of precipitant development or front for embezzlement, many of these projects were designed to fail because the regime received the largest benefit by starting them--not by completing them. This paper will explore the motivations, intentions, symbolism and repercussions for mounting an edifice of invincibility in front of a structure designed to crumble. By addressing these questions, this paper will provide a bridge between realist perceptions of these authoritarian regimes' capabilities and a postmodernist analysis of the power dynamic underlying the decision to undertake the impossible. Empirically this research will focus on Egypt with a secondary comparative case study in Romania and will trace a similar trajectory of public hydroengineering projects in both countries. Both countries had previously completed successful hydroengineering projects before taking on the impossible (the Suez Canal and Aswan High Dam in Egypt and the Vidaru Dam and the Danube Iron Gates in Romania). In Egypt, subsequent overambition has manifested itself in Mubarak's costly Toshka Project to build a second Nile River Valley; in Romania, with Ceaucescu's recommencement of the Danube-Black Sea Canal. The construction of Toshka has already taken longer than either the Suez Canal in 1859 or the Aswan High Dam in 1960, and completion is not expected for another ten years (at which time Mubarak will be 92). Correspondingly, the Danube-Black Sea Canal has been the most expensive engineering project in the history of Romania, taking 17 years to build and costing approximately 2 billion USD. The canal is not expected to be profitable for another 600 years. Despite the improbability of these projects, this strategy allowed both Mubarak and Ceaucescu to co-opt domestic opposition by embarking on lengthy, labor-intensive projects that are geographically remote from international oversight on a daily basis. While these actions display a veneer of modernity and technological innovation to the international community, their primary motivations are domestic in nature.