The integration of Ennahdha (Tunisia) and the Justice and Development Party (Morocco) in the established political game has given rise to various internal tensions (McCarthy 2018, Desrues 2015; 2018). In the case of Ennahdha, the cause of these conflicts was political (concerning the alliance with Nidaa Tunes in 2014 and Qalb Tunes in 2019), but also of ideological nature (concerning its “specialization” in view of becoming a civil party). These strategies generated a loss among Ennahdha’s electors and did not reach an agreement among the activists. Indeed, some activists left the party and ran for office, competing therefore with Ennahdha’s candidates. This paper will analyze the process of fragmentation and the currents existing within Ennahdha in a comparative perspective with the Moroccan PJD, in order to emphasize on the circulation of different models (models of political integration and organization, model of political strategy, models of internal management). In fact, as well as in Ennnahdha’s case, in Morocco, the strategy of integration into the political field was not followed by all the activists. Some of the latter left the original movement (The Islamic youth) in the 1980s to create their own groups, thus pluralizing the Islamic offer in Morocco (Desrues 2016, p 13). In addition, the sources of tension within the PJD are political: cohabitation with the monarchy (Desrues, 2018, p 2), the cooperation with certain parties (Desrues 2015, p 1-2; Desrues 2018, p 3), but also related to the internal management (control of the Movement for Unicity and Reform (Desrues 2015, p 12-13) and rivalry around leadership (Desrues 2015, p 12; 18). Firstly, the paper analyzes the Islamists movements’ process of internal fragmentation. Drawing on semi-structured interviews conducted with Ennahdha and the PJD between 2014 and 2020, it identifies several sources of internal tension related to ideology, political strategies, decision-making and the "specialization". It answers the questions: What are the internal currents inside Ennahdha and the PJD? Who are their leaders? Is it possible to envisage a third term for the current Ennahdha leader? What do we learn from the debate concerning Abdelilah Benkirane's third term? Secondly, we argue that the gradual opening of political systems in their respective countries pushed Islamists to reconsider their political discourse and strategies. We demonstrate that confronted with political competitors with whom they share some objectives and ideological references, Ennahdha and the PJD reform their discourse and renegotiate their political positions.