What are the determinants of public goods provision in authoritarian countries, and why do they differ across sectors? Scholars examining democracies have debated that office-seeking politicians allocate goods and services to either “core” or “swing” voters, whereas the literature on developing countries has demonstrated that patronage and clientelism shape social service provision. However, existing work does not provide an adequate explanation for (i) why authoritarian governments may invest in providing any benefits at all or (ii) why public goods provision may vary across sectors in autocracies. Using data on social service allocation in postwar Algeria (1998-2008), we find that education – enrollment and literacy rates – grew more rapidly in areas that voted in greater numbers for the Algeria’s ruling party prior to the civil war. However, we do not find the same pattern of other government benefits; for instance, water and electricity provision grew more rapidly in pre-war opposition strongholds. To explain the results, we argue that education is distinctive from other public goods because education works to advance the social status of government supporters. However, other public goods simply keep citizens afloat without providing the upward mobility. We also support our theory by qualitatively analyzing the centralization of the educational system and the decentralization of infrastructural authorities in Algeria.