This paper examines the use of Jordanian foreign policy by the Hashemite regime as a means to navigate between severe domestic and regional pressures unleashed by the “Arab Spring.” Bordering Syria, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Jordan is insecure in its foreign relations at the best of times; yet 2011 to 2013 has been especially tumultuous. More than 300,000 Syrian refugees have crossed to Jordan to escape the Syrian civil war (joining previous waves of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees). The regime fears that Syrian unrest will spill over into Jordan in still worse ways. Yet Jordan has also seen domestic protests every week for more than two years, calling for greater domestic reform. These internal and external political challenges come as Jordan is suffering a severe economic crisis. In this paper, I explain how the Hashemite regime is attempting to steer between Asad’s Syria to the north, and anti-Asad pressures from the south from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Jordan hopes to join the GCC, yet has no desire to antagonize Syria. The Arab spring has left the Hashemite regime less secure domestically and regionally. Yet many in Jordan’s pro-democracy opposition have heard this story too often before, and fear that domestic reform is once again being sacrificed on the altar of real or imagined regime security concerns. This paper examines not only how and why Jordanian foreign policy is attempting to navigate the pressures of the Arab spring, but also if this is sustainable. I argue that opening the domestic system further is actually essential to the security of both the country and the regime, and that relying on foreign policy alone can no longer help Jordan navigate the many pressures on state and society in the kingdom. Sources: The paper is based on extensive field research that includes interviews with both the regime and its critics. I have conducted field research in Jordan frequently for more than 20 years, most recently in June 2011, December 2011, May 2012, December 2012, and January 2013. My interviews include regime critics (Islamists, leftists, political parties, grassroots activists, journalists) as well as key elements of the regime itself (including interviews with government officials and Jordanian policy makers, such as foreign ministry officials, senators, cabinet ministers, prime ministers, and twice with King Abdullah II himself).