As Palestinian industry decreases in scope for reasons related to the intertwined imperatives of occupation and global political economy, new economic and social geographies are emerging between the West Bank and China. Although there have been no formal studies to date, there is plenty of anecdotal data. News reports describe family businesses destroyed by "cheap Chinese imports" and bemoan the lack of production, especially of heritage items like the kuffieh. A Palestinian importer spends half his year abroad-at first it was uncomfortable, but now there are many Arabs, "translators, and Syrian and Lebanese food." Another made Mandarin business cards. A 2008 New York Times piece describes Yiwu, "a buzzing trading spot thanks to the influx of Middle Eastern money…a hub for selling made-in-China Arabic products, like fashion clothing and religious artifacts." I have heard that "anyone with a few thousand dollars can get a visa to import a container." It is apparently harder in Ramallah to find stuffed neck, a fairly Hebron-specific dish, than when walking the "streets and streets" of Arab businesses "in China." There is a joke about an importer's pivot, innovation, and attentiveness to his context: finding himself with a container filled with too-big brassieres, he cut them up and made huge profits in the kippah market. Based on early-stage field research in Ramallah and Hebron, and in Beijing, Yiwu, and Guangzhou, I elaborate some of these links, and the relational geographies being produced. In particular, I am interested in how the global political economy touches the ground in Palestine, and what it has to do with occupation. These ties are often individual, questions of representation and conception-West Bank Palestinians understand China as a symbol for aspiration, while diaspora Palestinians in China, many of whom have never set foot in Palestine, see economics as part of a project to aid Palestine and enhance Palestinian identity in China. But there are also political, structural, and historical questions. How is it that Palestinians typically operating under severe mobility restrictions are being granted permits to travel? In what ways do occupation restrictions operate on particular forms of economic practice, through VAT, logistics, standardization, in addition to practical military prerogative? And given the worldwide shifts indicated by the historical movement from Bandung to neoliberalism, Maoism to "capitalism with Chinese characteristics," and from the PLO to the PA, what does it mean that such south-south ties are logically coherent today?