One of the primary discussions between Muslim philosophers and theologians concerns divine freedom. There are two basic questions regarding this problem: Firstly, was God free to create this world rather than creating another world? Secondly, was God free not to create any world at all? Avicenna, for instance, argues that, given the categorical difference between God and the imperfect nature of human beings, God’s actions should be considered neither intentional nor natural. His action of creating this world was volitional while not requiring alternative possibilities or the power to do otherwise. Nonetheless, though it was neither open to Him to refrain from creating this world nor any world at all, this does not imply, Avicenna believes, that He did not have freedom in His creating activity. Contrariwise, al-Ghazâlî, and Ma`t?r?dite and Mu`tazilite theologians, by assuming a single account of freedom both for human beings and God, argue that alternative possibilities and the power to do otherwise are required for acting with free will. Since God has a perfect freedom, it was open to him to create this world, or another world, or not to create anything at all. In this paper, I will look into this discussion in relation to contemporary discussion of the topic. In particular, Thomas Flint recently argued that although God has a power to choose between creating a specific world and not creating it, it is not possible that He does not create anything at all. In other words, while God is free with respect to creating and not creating a specific world, He is not free not to create anything at all. Given that God is a morally perfect being, not creating anything at all is not an alternative possibility with respect to His nature and attributes. I conclude that if this view is correct, it has the merit to provide a middle ground between two opposing theories in the Islamic world, since it takes into account the chief motivations of both sides.