The counter-revolutionary intervention was highly determinant in the trajectory and eventually in the failure of Arab uprisings across the MENA region. Thus, it is important to understand the role and nature of local actors, who functioned as a proxy for the sponsors of the counter-revolutionary agenda in executing the mission of throwing the revolutionary path off the track in individual countries that have gone through uprisings. Madkhali Salafis in Libya perfectly fits into the definition of a proxy or tool, which served the counter-revolutionary agenda by targeting and undermining especially revolutionary and Islamist actors, particularly post-2014. Certain regional countries managed to design Libyan social, military, political and religious landscape through Madkhali Salafis. Methodology The material connection between Madkhali Salafis in Libya and their foreign patrons will be established based on the accounts of several Libyan interviewees. The interviewees consisted of former pioneers of Madkhali Salafism in Libya, ordinary Libyans who experienced the certain repressive practices of Madkhali Salafis, and a variety of professionals, academics, civil society members. They witnessed the capabilities and conduct of Madkhali Salafis at different levels. Also, the attention will be drawn to the instances of constant overlap between the actions, narratives, selection of targets, and alliance formation of Madkhali Salafis and those of their external patrons to demonstrate the coordination between them. Data 1) Madkhali Salafis are named after their founder, the Saudi cleric Rabee Al-Madkhali who has been residing in Saudi Arabia. Madkhali Salafis in Libya follow orders from Saudi Arabia. 2) Libyan individuals that were threatened by Madkhali Salafis were either killed or had to flee the country post-2014, who also happened to be targeted politically by certain regional countries. 3) The role of Madkhali Salafi Brigade 555’s defection from Government of National Accord (GNA) affiliated forces to Khalifa Haftar’s side in the fall of Sirte, which became the borderline dividing Libya’s two political and military camps. This work contributes to the literature on the intersection of Salafism and geopolitics in the MENA region by providing data and analysis for Madkhali Salafis’ unique quality as a proxy. It also demonstrates that despite its façade as a purely religious organisation, Madkhali Salafis are a far-reaching social and political project with arms in religious, education, military and media sectors. Its peculiar creed makes it extremely useful for authoritarian regimes.