Thesis. The rentier framework vastly overstated economic determinism in analysis of the states of the GCC. In reality, money does not spend itself. Choices are made by ruling families about who gets how much when. Distributive choices are important as they often reflect sectarian politics and affect state building projects. Method. This analysis is comparative across the states of the GCC and is based on field work between September 2011 and March 2012 (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia). I begin with a brief look at the demographic balance and historical context of distribution, sect and state building. Specific issues include provision of jobs, education, subsidies, housing, salaries as well as the larger discourse on sect that is shaped by religious authorities, government officials and state-controlled media. Argument. The politics of distribution and sect are evident in state policy. I focus on three themes. First, distributive politics have been resurrected across much of the Peninsula with the Arab uprisings. States implemented such policies in order to prevent further encroachment of the “Arab Spring” into the GCC. I determine if there are patterns in distribution and delineate the timing, amount, the population to whom it was directed and the form it took. For example, massive housing schemes in Saudi Arabia; a 60% salary increase overnight in Qatar; and in Oman, unemployment grants, student stipends and 50,000 jobs. Second, the politics of naturalization and citizenship in distributive states, especially as it relates to sect. Bahrain has naturalized many Baloochis, Syrians and Jordanians who are Sunni to counterbalance the Shi’a majority. Saudi Arabia naturalizes Sunni populations to balance the Ismaili population in the south. Kuwait has naturalized thousands of Sunni Saudis. The UAE is likely to naturalize Sunni bidoon. Third, the dynamics between sect, state and the large foreign worker population. The state plays migrant laborers and sect off each other. This is especially evident in Bahrain. Conclusions. While observers used to analyze sect vis a vis individual sovereign states on the Peninsula, it is important to comprehend that the regimes have re-framed this issue to be sect vis a vis the Gulf Cooperation Council. I demonstrate how the ruling families have coalesced around this issue. This is evident in the speeches of senior Princes, in the GCC response to the uprising in Bahrain and in a thinly veiled suggestion of an extra-territorial response to uprisings in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.