The "Arab Spring" that erupted at late 2010 has long since metamorphosed into an Islamic Winter. While in Tunis, Egypt and Libya, one can speak about the "end of the beginning" of these revolutions, so it seems, in Syria the uprising has turned into bloody civil war between segments and factions divided for the most part along social or communal lines. Year 2013 was expected to be the year of Iran, but instead it turned to be the year of Syria. Indeed, the Arab Spring, which has left the Syrian regime mired in a bloody civil war the past two years, has also increased Israel's freedom of operation to levels not seen in years. Indeed, since the beginning of 2013 Israel has tried to exploit Bashar al- Asad's weaknesses by introducing new rules, among them that Israel can veto any arms shipment to Hizballah that includes advanced weapon systems. Israel would also like veto power over the Syrian military's acquisition of advanced weaponry such as the S-300 surface to air missile system. However, the increased tension between Israel and Syria has coincided with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's recent military victories. Asad's regime has regained the offensive in the Syrian civil war. His forces have successfully repelled the rebels' attacks on the capital and on Aleppo, the second-largest city in Syria. With the help of his allies, Hezbollah, he has regained control over several strategic sites that had been bitterly contested for several months. It seems, then, that the expert analyses that predicted Assad's imminent downfall were premature. Although Bashar al-Asad has so far stayed away from a confrontation with Israel, he may ultimately conclude that perpetual restraint is a form of weakness. It could hurt him more than a an all-out war with his neighbor to the south. Thus, Like Syria's other neighbors Israel is left with the question of who it should root for in Syria. This dilemma dates back to the earliest stages of the Syrian revolution. Would its interests be better served by a Hezbollah-and-Iran-backed Assad holding on to power, or by having the Islamic opposition emerge victorious. In the meantime, Israel seeks to maintain the status qua in its relations with Egypt, under President Mursi, Jordan and with the Palestinians, believing that its strategic goal should be managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not solving it.