In October 2019, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese from all walks of life spontaneously took to the streets to topple the political system and those sectarian elites responsible for the deteriorating socioeconomic situation in Lebanon. Struggling to afford university fees and find proper employment that would allow them to meet skyrocketing living expenses, an unprecedented number of youths mobilized and participated in the protest movement, dubbed the October Revolution, in their pursuit of a better country. High school and university students, who constituted the majority of participating youth, went on strike to take part in the nationwide demonstrations and organize daily educational sessions in public spaces, known as “protest schools.” Students also advocated merit-based employment, payment of tuitions fees in Lebanon pounds rather than US dollars at private institutions, and the independence of the public Lebanese University from political intervention. Their political participation was not only on the streets: secular clubs also won most seats in student elections at reputable universities. With the rapid spread of COVID-19, the Lebanese government imposed the first lockdown in March 2020, thus limiting citizens’ right to protest. Many youths quickly shifted their focus to social media to live-stream political discussions and organize campaigns. But protesters broke lockdown by returning to the streets after the deadly Beirut port blast in August 2020. Sporadic anti-government protests continue today, as the economic crisis has pushed around three-quarters of the population into poverty. And as Lebanese youth continue to grapple with the political and economic reality in Lebanon, youth-led mass mobilization efforts seem likely. Mona Harb (2018) classifies three kinds of Lebanese youth engagement: conformists who privilege sectarian politics, alternative groups working with NGOs, and new activists who rely on more horizontal engagement methods and loose organizational systems focused on radical and progressive issues. Despite Lebanon’s political system that limits dissent, the latter continue to find means to organize collectively and challenge the regime. This paper builds on Harb’s classifications and seeks to investigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on youth activism and whether other types of youth engagement have emerged in Lebanon. It emphasizes the willingness or lack thereof of Lebanese youth to organize and/or participate in anti-government protests during the ongoing pandemic despite the health risks and collapsed healthcare system. This paper also focuses on the political agency of young people and the everyday forms of dissent they are relying on due to the pandemic.