In his text After the Sheikhs, Christopher Davidson makes a bold claim that by 2015, the Gulf monarchies would cease to exist as we know them (Davidson 2015). More than a decade earlier, Jill Crystal presciently observed that “despite the obituaries regularly written for these regimes, their rulers have survived the arrival and departure of Britain, the trials of independence, and now the new demands of oil wealth” (Crystal 1989). These two scholars frame an interesting puzzle: Why do Gulf monarchies survive? Why have scholars incorrectly predicted their demise? And why, if relatively small and weak do these states maintain independence in foreign policy decision making? This paper uses a comparative case study of Kuwaiti foreign policy, informed by two decades of comparative ethnographic research, to advance an understanding of small state behavior and survivability in the Arabian Gulf. The paper argues that states, whether small or large, act to preserve sovereignty and project power, using their limited capabilities and powerful friend networks to deflect threats. In other words, small states are like all other states; to predict their demise is to underestimate their capabilities; and expressions of independence in foreign policy decision making provide evidence to support the other two claims. Two recent Kuwaiti foreign policy decisions are used to test these claims. In 2017, Kuwait’s Emir decided not to join the 2017 blockade of Qatar. In fact, in addition to seeking an independent, mediating role in the conflict, Kuwait expanded relations with Qatar—including establishing new contracts for natural gas imports, expanding direct flights, enhancing bi-lateral trade and investment, and pursuing a foreign policy that provided Qatar a way to subvert the blockade. Similarly, but perhaps even more dramatically demonstrating the small state’s independence in foreign policy decision making, in spite of pressure from the administration of President Donald Trump, and regional neighbors including UAE and Bahrain, Kuwait contradicted the US President’s statement that “Kuwait would be next to make peace with Israel” by stating instead that Kuwait “would be the last to make peace with Israel.” This paper will explore the power and politics behind these two events to advance theories of small state behavior and the survival of a Gulf monarchy.