The 2003 Iraq war accorded the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) further opportunity to consolidate its power by cooperating with occupation forces to fight against Saddam Hussein loyalists, who strived to return to power. Kurdish politicians exploited the political vacuum in Baghdad and Iraq’s occupation to improve their influence inside and outside Iraq. Being aware that the United States and the neighboring states, especially Turkey, were against declaring independence, however, the Iraqi Kurds carefully enshrined their vision in the Iraqi constitution for a federal democratic state that would grant them maximum autonomy. As a result, by 2010 the Kurds had their own de facto government, territorial borders, constitution, army, border guards, low-key diplomatic representation aboard and a flourishing economy. When Falah Mustafa, the KRG’s Foreign Relations officer, was asked on December 2, 2010 to explain why some Arabs were alleging that the KRG was establishing ties with foreign governments in preparation for declaring independence, Mustafa claimed his office was simply acting in line with the Iraqi Constitution. He added that KRG President Barzani’s roundtable initiative of November 11, 2010 to break eight months’ of political impasse following the Iraqi national elections of March 7, 2010 was proof that the Kurds supported Iraq’s unity. Nevertheless, while presiding over the 13th Congress of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Arbil in December 2010, Barzani shocked Arab groups as well as Turkish officials by asking the Congress to analyze the Kurdish people’s rights to self-determination. Some observers speculated that Barzani had directed his remarks at those wanting to rewrite the constitution by warning that the Kurds might declare independence if they tried to curtail the KRG’s authority. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the future prospects for the Iraqi Kurds in terms of how susceptible the KRG is to domestic Iraqi Arab and regional Arab forces seeking to reduce its autonomy within a recentralized Iraq. Will the KRG be able to maintain its autonomy, negotiate a favorable hydrocarbon law, and implement Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution regarding the future of Kirkuk, among a plethora of other concerns? This paper will employ objective content analysis of primary KRG documents as well as scholarly and media articles from various Western and neighboring regional states to analyze the future prospects for the KRG.