This paper examines the role of the judiciary -criminal courts, the military courts and the State Security Court-- in prosecuting political dissent in Syria (1990-2010). It examines trends over time regarding the degree and nature of judicializing the repression of political dissent. The question whether variations in this respect matter in terms of the severity of punishment and, in view of that, the regime's reliance on coercive strategies is addressed. The paper argues that the main variables driving judicialization and associated variations in the venue and quality of 'justice' result from a complex of interconnected and complementary factors: (1) The Syrian regime's motives to develop, use, and rely on the judiciary for both ideological and tactical purposes; (2) shifting outcomes of struggles and competition among regime factions; (3) the regime's historical and evolving relations with the legal profession - lawyers and judges alike-- embedded in the overall power configurations underlying the rise, consolidation and reproduction of authoritarian rule. Finally, it will be explored whether and how the judicialization of political repression in Syria --against the odds of limited judicial independence-- furnished regime opponents and critics with avenues by which to contest authoritarian regime prerogatives and legitimacy. Key sources for this paper include: notes by foreign diplomats observing political trials in Syria; the author's own trial observations; the author's interviews with Syrian lawyers, officials, former detainees and human rights activists; Syrian official publications for lawyers and judges; the Syrian state-owned press; and reports by Syrian and international human rights organizations.