After the 2011 Moroccan constitution for the first time stipulated that judges are allowed to form associations (Article 111), Moroccan judges began to organise and establish the country’s first independent judges club (nādī al-quḍāt). Approximately 2900 judges have joined the club so far. This raises questions about what motivates judges to organise and what kind of change they want to see implemented. Also, what is the club likely to achieve? Since its creation, the club has called for the establishment of an independent judiciary and has held multiple sit-ins to give weight to its demands and to protest against the executive’s heavy hand in the judiciary and more specifically against the tutelage of the Moroccan Ministry of Justice. This paper argues that the establishment of the club, most of whose members are in their thirties and forties, is partly an expression of a generational conflict within the judicial establishment. These younger judges challenge existing patterns of authority within the judiciary and wider Moroccan society. Similarly to the Arab Spring protests material deprivation and a perceived lack of dignity also motivate judges to organise. The club has asked to improve judges’ material conditions to make them less prone to corruption. Members want to re-establish the “reputation of the judiciary” which is commonly perceived as corrupt and inefficient; they thereby try to re-establish their own reputation and dignity. While it is quite possible that the club will achieve some internal reforms of the judiciary regarding training methods, promotion patterns, an increase in salaries, and a reform of the curriculum, it is unlikely that the club will achieve the establishment of a completely independent judiciary, because the judges club has so far not questioned the executive role of the monarchy within the judiciary. Members of the club acknowledge the king as the central figure of Moroccan politics and view the monarch as part of the solution, not the problem. Accordingly, they have asked for the implementation of Article 107 of the constitution that stipulates that the king guarantees the independence of the judiciary. Therefore, change in the short term will likely reshape the relationship between the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice, but will not affect the monarchy’s heavy hand in the judicial system.