Ever since Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989—and especially in the past few years—there has been heightened interest, among regime supporters, in the revolutionary leader’s capacity to perceive particular realities. This capacity is said to have been indispensible for the very success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Tied loosely to the clerical establishment and pivotal historical figures of the Shi’i tradition, the ability to disclose esoteric dimensions of the cosmos is said to be restricted from other segments of Iranian society such as intellectuals and learned youth. According to regime apologists who maintain this position, one of the primary tasks of the theocratic regime is to impart the knowledge attained by Khomeini to the citizenry. Although much of the state’s ideological energies have been directed towards this end, efforts have been largely unsuccessful. A wholesale liquidation of previously held revolutionary motifs and the adoption, rejuvenation, and institutionalization of an apocalyptic narrative of history has been the consequence of a collection of such minute failures in the ideological efficiency of the state. One problem associated with the transmission of specialized knowledge may be located at the level of Khomeini’s epistemological foundations. Quite a few studies have been undertaken to analyze the basis of Khomeini’s later political thought where his mystical inclinations have been prominent (See, for instance: Bonaud 1995; Knysh 1992; and Moazami 2009). In this paper, it will be argued that the ruling apparatus did not take its own historiographical conclusions to heart. When the clerics were theoretically placed at the vanguard of all modern progressive movements, there was said to be something that radically distinguished them from other oppositional elements. In the case of Khomeini, it was his gnostic capacities that differentiated him from even the Marxists who believed that historical materialism would offer a similar form of downreaching exploration. Knowledge attained by these means cannot be transmitted through conventional ideological institutions. One of the great follies of the current state can be located in this misrecognition. An example of an area of mystical exploration exemplified by Khomeini that is attempted to be imparted upon the Iranian population is that of Satanology (sheytan shenasi). The ayatollah’s declaration that the United States is the Great Satan (sheytan-e bozorg) was not simply a symbolic consolidation of prevailing social opinion. Rather, Khomeini saw something that no one else saw. The paper will thus include an appraisal of this theme.