The thesis of this paper is that while Islamic banking is working nowadays globally in a more de-ideologized environment, on the national level, political considerations play a significant role, taking the Turkish interest-free participation banks as an example. The analysis, based on data of the Turkish Participation Banks Association and the development of participation banking sector, is interpreted in the light of political programmes and statements, changing government support and state regulations for participation banks. In Turkey, the foundation of interest-free banking in the 1980s was in line with the politics of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the Özal era. While Islamic bankers in Turkey were acting in a pragmatic way, the oppositional conservative Refah party called for an interest-free economy, evaluating interest as a part of the “köle düzeni” (slavery system), and leading to the economic exploitation of Turkey. Since the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, a change of attitude towards Islamic finance can be observed globally. Islamic and conventional bankers saw Islamic finance mainly as an ordinary business, which satisfies legitimate consumer demands. In this de-ideologized environment, political support just aimed at creating a plain level field of competition, in order to strengthen financial centres like London. Throughout the late 1990s, the laicist government of Turkey fought against “green capital”, which means companies who had a close connection with Islamist political groups or parties. With such a tense atmosphere, even regular Islamic banks faced several problems that slowed down their progress and prosperity. After AKP’s elections win in 2002, the political scene was again favourable towards participation banks (as Islamic banks were renamed then). In the recent years, there has been a new initiative of the Turkish government to increase participation banking’s share from 5% to 15% till 2025, and to make Turkey an international hub of Islamic finance. This paper argues that this policy is not purely an economic instrument to attract Gulf investments or to increase the savings rate, but it is embedded in an again more ideologized rhetoric. Conventional banks are attacked by the president for taking interest rates deemed too high and blamed for the economic difficulties that Turkey has been experiencing recently. Boosting interest-free state participation banks, therefore, legitimizes the AKP’s government as being based on conservative Islamic values and partially exonerates the government from the responsibility for the recent economic problems.