A large body of work in political science and sociology has examined how authoritarian regimes manage social protests. Much of this scholarship is movement-oriented, probing how autocrats combine repression and concessions in response to particular social movements. More recently, scholars have become more interested in the micro-foundations of bargained authoritarianism: how do non-democratic states use local bargaining techniques to fragment, diffuse, and manage protest activity. In this field, studies highlight that pro-active protest management exists even in highly concentrated, single-party regimes. To date, less research has systemically investigated protest management in the MENA region, despite the region’s unique combination of oil rents and state populism. In this paper, I examine protest management and bargaining in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Empirically, the paper has three main interests. First, I probe how the extent to which state officials interfere in protests. Secondly, I investigate what types of state bodies are usually called on to talk to protestors. Finally, I examine how concessions and promises influence subsequent movement trajectories. I am especially interested in backlash effects, whereby official failure to realize promises pushes protestors to escalate their protests. To do this, I use a novel dataset on socio-economic contention in Iran between 2012-21 (N=2789). This dataset was compiled by manually coding Persian-language protest reports, paying particular attention to bargaining processes and government concessions. I review the potential biases and limitations of this dataset. I find that protest bargaining is extensive in Iran, and that protestors often gain concessions. At the same time, it is highly fragmented, requiring coordination among a wide range of government bodies. The paper probes the implications of the findings for the study of authoritarian politics. Officials may be able to fragment protests through localized concessions and bargaining, but this process may lead to new grievances that can escalate claim-making on the state.