On May 15, 1947, The United Nations General Assembly created a committee to investigate and propose solutions to what they called "the problem of Palestine." This United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), made up of representatives from eleven different countries, spent three activity-packed months in the United States, the Middle East, and Europe. Yet by the end of their journey, the members of UNSCOP were divided. Two solutions were recommended instead of one: a proposal for partitioning Palestine supported by the majority, and a proposal to create a shared federal state supported by a minority. One clear authority in the minority proposal was delegate Sir Abdur Rahman, the representative from India. Sir Rahman's own country was undergoing a bloody partition that same summer contributed to his opposition to partitioning Palestine. However, his warnings were repeatedly dismissed. Despite Sir Rahman's involvement in two of the most important partitions of the mid-20th century and his prescient warnings regarding the dangers of partition, most scholars of Palestinian history who focus on the 1947 UNSCOP plan have ignored both his contributions and significance in establishing not just parallels, but connections, between the Palestinian and Indian partitions. The few works that do cover Sir Rahman often do so within a foreign policy framework rather than examining his contributions to UNSCOP, simplifying Sir Rahman's stance as pro-Arab or focusing on the genealogy of Israeli political relations with India and Pakistan. My paper instead centers Sir Rahman's viewpoint within a story of Palestinian partition, drawing on original oral history interviews conducted with members of Sir Rahman's family, historical newspaper coverage of UNSCOP's journey in Arabic, Hebrew, and English, and UN digital archives of UNSCOP proceedings. It paints a picture of the march towards Palestine's partition from the perspective of an anti-partition intellectual. It argues that understanding Sir Rahman's connection to the partition of India is crucial to understanding what helped precipitate the main ideological divergences between the UNSCOP majority and minority recommendations for Palestine. Ultimately, by tracing the UNSCOP story through Sir Abdur Rahman, this paper will support the growing body of literature that assesses the logic and consequences of partitions across the British Empire, placing Palestinian history in a comparative framework. Centering Sir Rahman's prudent lack of faith in partition also highlights the way that "Third World" historical actors' critiques can provide historians with new ways for understanding international and colonial policy.