Many Middle Eastern states have experienced protracted droughts, fluctuations in water variability, and internal and cross-border migration that have challenged states’ capacity to manage domestic water resources. This paper examines how Israel, Syria, and Jordan framed the connections between migration, water, and climate variability differently, despite sharing experiences of drought and considering water resources a national security imperative. In Israel, heightened securitization of the links between migration and water scarcity have clouded the underlying causes of migration, where immigration is largely due to conflict and economic reasons. In contrast, in Syria we find that governing elites downplayed connections between internal migration and drought in the late 2000s, building upon years of failure to adapt agricultural and water policies that constrained its ability to effectively respond to drought-induced migration. While Jordan has sought to improve water use efficiency over the last decade, a securitized water policy that prioritized augmentation of supply and large controversial infrastructure projects constrained its ability to build local adaptive capacities.