A new development in the Muslim world is the formation of Islamic political parties (IPP) by reactionary Islamic movements in countries as geographically distant and historically disparate as Morocco, Yemen, and Indonesia. Transforming a movement into a party runs the risk of being repressed by an authoritarian regime, or alienating its supporters. The benefits of transforming a movement into a party, especially in an authoritarian context, remain unclear. Hence, the question I ask is: "Why have so many Islamic movements chosen to expend considerable resources to form political parties?" Questioning the motivations behind party formation sheds some light on the bigger debate in Islamic politics - whether IPPs are/can be democratic. Some argue that IPPs are "wolves in sheep clothes" trying to establish an Islamic state without a sincere commitment to democracy. Others see IPP formation as a democratic demand for greater religious liberty and representation under authoritarianism. The increased role of women through women branches in this transformation into an IPP is pointed by IPPs as a sign of their commitment to democracy. In consequence, grasping the incentives behind this movement-into-party transformation will contribute to understanding the bigger picture of democracy and Islam. In previous research, arguments have been made that IPP formation is the result of political liberalization or moderation. However, political liberalization or moderation does not lead every Islamic movement to form a party, nor Islamic endorsement explains this transformation. Hence, based on my secondary and field research, I argue that (1) under authoritarian but tolerant regimes, (2) a new "excluded" class in solidarity with Islamic networks emerges, (3) whose demands are taken over by pragmatic leaders who see more benefits in party formation and regard remaining as a movement as potentially risky. From a sample of Muslim majority countries with elections and moderate Islamic movements, I chose Turkey, Morocco and Jordan as my primary cases. My cases host both movements that turn to an IPP and those that reject such transformation. This not only allows me to look at a cross-country comparison but also at variation within a single case. This paper will discuss the Jordanian case of Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front in comparative perspective to other cases by combining quantitative data from Polity IV Political Regime Characteristics: 1800-2008, ILO, UNDP, SESIC, and WB; theoretical framework from literatures on authoritarianism, hegemony, Islamic discourse, social movements, and political parties; and, qualitative data from my fieldwork.