Institutionalized power-sharing is considered the best chance for divided societies to sustain peace, but there is a widespread consensus on its negative implications for good governance and public service delivery. Institutions and parties associated with sectarian power-sharing came under immense pressure lately in the Middle East, when widespread protests erupted against sectarian political elites (empowered by power-sharing institutions) in Iraq and Lebanon beginning from the end of the 2010s. Youth played important roles in these movements as they were more likely to be against sect-based institutions and power-sharing. In this context, we explore the determinants and conditions of support for and protests against power-sharing in Lebanon. Using a survey experiment with the youth in Lebanon, we test whether priming on certain perceived benefits (inclusive distribution of state resources and maintenance of peace and security) or harms (corruption among the political elite and decreased security) makes it more likely for young people to sign a petition against power-sharing. We find that the Lebanese youth are almost equally divided in their support for and protest against the current power-sharing regime in the country. While the secular youth aims to upend the system, youth which has perceived connections with the religious and political elite are against its demise. Surprisingly, priming on the potential security benefits of power-sharing makes the youth more likely to protest the current system. Additional data and analyses suggest that this security benefit argument (widely used by the sectarian political elite) makes the youth feel even more alienated from the sectarian power-sharing system, and paradoxically encourages them to protest it. The contributions of the paper are manifold: (1) We explore the micro-foundations of power-sharing - rather than the macro-dynamics and effects of this set of institutions; (2) we systematically assess how different articulated justifications for and critiques of this system shape popular support for it; (3) we look at how distinct components of the youth population envision this system that has shaped and will continue to shape their lives; and (4) last but not least, we show that a system that has so obviously failed the population and that scholars critique so vehemently actually enjoys genuine popular support.