Iran’s oil revenue per capita is far lower than that of any other Persian Gulf country, and it is considerably lower than that of Libya, Venezuela, and even Algeria. Thus while Iran is often described as a rentier state, its economy and politics are affected much less by oil revenue than these other countries. However, like all oil-producing countries, Iran’s oil revenue has fluctuated tremendously, experiencing four major “boom and bust” cycles since 1970. Consequently, while Iran is not a prominent example of a rentier state, there have been four periods in recent decades when its oil revenue has been quite high and rentier effects presumably have been fairly strong, followed by periods in which Iran’s oil revenue and rentier effects have been much weaker. Thus we can speak of Iran as a “cyclical rentier state” – one in which rentier effects on its economy and politics have been transitory, though recurrent. This paper will examine how these cyclical fluctuations in Iran’s oil revenue have affected its economy and politics. It will focus on three sets of factors. First, it will examine how Iran’s macroeconomic and fiscal responses to these four cycles of boom and bust were shaped by the very different leaders who held power during these periods, ranging from an aloof, autocratic monarch in the 1970s to populist radical Islamists in the 1980s, pragmatic centrist Islamists in the 1990s, and populist “neoconservative” Islamists after early 2004. Second, it will examine whether Iran’s macroeconomic and fiscal policy during the last three of these periods showed evidence that Iran’s leaders had “learned” from earlier experiences – especially from the catastrophic political consequences of the first oil boom, in the mid-1970s. Third, it will examine how idiosyncratic factors affected Iran’s macroeconomic and fiscal responses to cycles of oil boom and bust, including the magnitude of each cycle, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and other contextual conditions. Taken together, these three sets of factors provide a good first cut at understanding the political-economy dynamics of Iran’s cyclical rentier state.