The construction of centralized water and energy infrastructures has profoundly shaped Libya’s political and economic development. Libya’s national oil company (NOC) continues to provide most government revenue, while the Great Man-Made River Authority (GMMR) supplies water from Saharan fossil aquifers to populated areas in the interior and on the coast. Our paper asks how these centralized institutions have navigated the proliferation and decentralization of territorial control and political-military authority since the 2011 collapse of the Gaddafi regime. We find that while parties to the conflict sought to control, capture, divert, and sometimes sabotage these critical infrastructures, they also recognized the continued functioning of these infrastructures as essential in providing revenue, basic services, and supporting their claims to external recognition and sovereignty. We argue that despite increasing fragmentation among political-military factions since 2012, the NOC and the GMMR retained some autonomy from various belligerents and political groups, maintaining a national presence despite political fragmentation. We document that while water and energy infrastructures were not subject to the kinds of widespread destruction found in the Syrian and Yemen conflicts, protracted conflict nevertheless undermined capacities for oil production and safe water delivery. This paper is part of a broader project exploring changing practices of warfare and the targeting of the environment and civilian infrastructures in wars in the Middle East and North Africa since the 2011 uprisings. The paper draws upon a unique dataset constructed by the authors that tracks the targeting of civilian infrastructure in the Libyan conflict from 2011 until 2022. The data incorporates discrete and aggregate incidents of infrastructure targeting from newspapers, UN documents, human rights reports, and draws upon the Airwars and ACLED datasets. The authors utilize interviews with humanitarian and governmental actors in Washington D.C. and Geneva, and Zoom interviews with Libyan figures from civil society and political groups. The paper contributes to our broader understanding of the political economy of rentier states, environmental security and peacebuilding, and the role of natural resources in conflict. We build upon earlier works that examine the importance of oil in the creation of the modern Libyan state and its political economy, but the paper extends this literature to look at the role of centralized oil and water infrastructures under conditions of protracted conflict. We highlight how institutions charged with providing large-scale energy and water infrastructures navigated territorial and political fragmentation, and outline the consequences for human security, humanitarian assistance, and governance.