Occasionalism is the theory that God is the sole creator of every contingent thing. There is no secondary causation in nature and the causes that we think we are observing are merely occasions for God’s creation. Although many Western scholars, Muslim theologians in particular, defended occasionalism for centuries, there are a few philosophers who hold occasionalism recently. Contrary to the contemporary disinclination for occasionalism, a revived theistic account of causation is necessary for a theist who endorses the idea that God is the only creator in the universe. Given that almost all orthodox Muslim scholars – Ash’arites and Ma’t?r?dites – adopted occasionalism, a defense of occasionalism on philosophical and theological grounds is particularly necessary for a Muslim theist who shares the same intuitions with them. My aim in this paper is to show that occasionalism is not only a viable and plausible theory to explain God’s relation to causality for a theist or at least for a Muslim theist, but also is a better theory than the rival theistic theories such as mere conservationism and concurrentism. In so doing, this paper addresses two questions. First, what is the best theistic view to explain God’s relation to causality? I will look into the alternative theistic explanations and argue that occasionalism provides a better insight for a theist to deal with the problem at hand. I will take al-Ghaz?l?’s arguments for occasionalism as a representation of occasionalist arguments. But, occasionalism seems at variance with our intuitive idea that there is a kind of necessity in natural operations. This objection leads us to the second question: What is the plausible causal theory that an occasionalist can adopt to protect both the so-called sense of necessity and God’s comprehensive creation? I will look into the contemporary causal theories and conclude that neither reductionist nor anti-reductionist causal theories is open to an occasionalist. I will use Alvin Plantinga’s notion, “creaturely inviolability” to describe our sense of necessity in causal relations. I will follow al-Ghaz?l? and argue that this necessity comes from divine decree but not from the nature of objects. Thus, while occasionalism avoids the necessitarian views according to which there is a kind of logical necessity between causes and effects, it protects the intuitive idea that there is a kind of necessity between causes and effects. I conclude that this point particularly makes occasionalism a better option for a theist.