When popular uprisings and social unrest lead to regime-change, the political behavior of the military is key to the transitional process. Civil-military relations literature suggests that the institutionalization and professionalization of the military are primary factors in explaining the military’s propensity to intervene. However, little attention has been paid to the role of economic interests and how it shapes military leaders’ decision-making. This paper casts new light on the discussion of the military’s role in shaping outcomes of regime-change by exploring this through an economic lens. Hence this paper attempts to answer the key question: How does the military’s economic interests affect its political behavior? To do so, this paper compares the cases of Egypt and Turkey, two prominent examples of military intervention into politics and of military predominance over civilian affairs. Preliminary findings suggest that the military’s economic interests played a defining role in the decision-making process and prospects for democratization in both countries. Finally, this paper offers a framework for analysis from which to explore other cases in the Middle East and beyond.