In May 2016, the Turkish government classified the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization, calling it Fethullahç? Terör Örgütü (Fethullah Terror Organization), or FETÖ. This formal acronym for the organization had circulated in Turkish media since early 2015, presumably developing from a common nickname for Fethullah Gülen, “Feto,” the Turkish scholar and imam who has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999. The acronym FETÖ gained prominence from December 2015 to January 2016 when a Turkish court issued an arrest warrant and began a trial in absentia for Gülen. At the moment of its emergence, not all media outlets chose to use the acronym, as it sounded somewhat like targeted political hyperbole born of a political rift between two former allies, President Erdo?an and Gülen (Tayyip and Feto). After the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, however, avoiding the acronym became impossible since the putsch’s mastermind was immediately named: FETÖ. This essay maps the history of the FETÖ acronym in Turkish media and politics, arguing that the emergence of this proper name produced a political reality and an organization as an object of knowledge. As theorists of language and representation have long shown, proper names uniquely embody the descriptive and constitutive dimension of language simultaneously, relying on the paradox of this simultaneity for the production of authority. The emergence of FETÖ as a political category and its subsequent formal classification as a terrorist organization had a number of strategic political, legal, and social effects, not least of which was the possibility of successfully charging Gülen supporters with terrorism-related crimes after some prominent cases were dismissed. But the acronym also broadly remade the landscape of dissent and control in Turkish politics, solidifying a political imaginary sanctioned by the government as newly hegemonic. In examining the historical production of knowledge and authority that circulates through the FETÖ acronym, this essay does not chase down coup-related conspiracy theories, debunk political arguments, or defend Gülen. The essay argues that to name a terrorist organization is to describe and simultaneously produce it as a category of knowledge, something that can be located, bounded, and policed. Naming FETÖ produces it as a distinct phenomenon, and this phenomenon generated its own unique mechanisms of regulation, discipline, and control. Inability to avoid the acronym after the 2016 coup attempt is a symptom of the way the acronym reshapes political reality.