This paper examines some of the challenges the counterinsurgency strategy of the Obama administation faces in Afghanistan. It argues that the many of the challenges that confound development straties in Counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts are also exist in post-conflict reconstruction processes in countries where violence has been brough to an end. In particular, these challenges center on satisfying the immediate needs of the population, building government capaicity, and involving local communities in the development process. In short, any post-conflict reconstruction process is a balancing act between providing security, humanitarian relief, and physical infrastrucuture, on the one hand, and addressing longer-term development objectives on the other. In the context of Afghanistan where the conflict is on-going, however, this balancing act become that much more complex since development and humanitarian assistance are inextricably linked with the military objecitves of the United States and its NATO allies. This nexus between security and development means that short-term security objectives may trump short-term and especially long-term development objectives. In other words, there is an inherent tension between the need to provide quick development projects that can "win the hearts and minds" of the popualtion which is central to the COIN effort and the need to craft long-term, sustainable development. This paper, argues that a key challenge that COIN efforts will face is how to draw on the best practices of development and post-conflict reconstruction work that point to key role that local capacity-building and lccoal owership of development efforts in ensuring sustainable development. Despite the existence of these best practices, translating this knolwedge into effective programming in post-conflict reconstruction has frequently not met the expectations of the local communities. All to often, reconstruction, reconciliation, and peace-building projects have been designed and implemented by international donors in ways that reflect their priorities, preferences, and values rather than those of local communities. As a consequence, local communities do not always feel that they have been sufficiently consulted during the process of design and implementation. Without such consultaitons and community input, many projects, however, well-intentioned, remain alien and disconnected from the needs and realities of ordinary people. By examining public opinion data from Afghanistan, this paper argues that in a case like Afghanistan, where the development process is so closely linked to miltiary objectives, this lack of local ownership of development is even more pronounced. This in turn has deteriminetal impact on launching sustainable development programs.