While the great diversity and vitality of thought in the early modern Ottoman Empire has been recognized, the relationship between ??fism, invigorated by Ibn ?Arab?’s ontological and epistemological framework, and the law remains poorly understood. Sixteenth-century Ottoman jurists levelled many criticisms against Ibn ?Arab? and philosophical mysticism, wary of the subversive potential of ??f? epistemology for their traditional authority. In particular, the capacity of an advanced ??f? to perceive the hidden “reality” (?aq?qa) underlying the shar??a through kashf (unveiling) or ilh?m (inspiration) threatened the necessity of recourse to legal reasoning as developed in works of u??l and fur?? al-fiqh, while the individualistic nature of ??f? “reasoning” undermined the communal nature of Islamic rule-derivation and verification. This tension was not ignored by early-modern ??f?s and jurists. Thus far, some attention has been paid to the 16th-century Cairene Sh?fi?? jurist ?Abd al-Wahh?b al-Sha?r?n? (d. 973/1565), whose al-M?z?n al-kubr? sought to accommodate ??f? ontology and epistemology to the traditional strictures of the law. The present paper focuses on a less-studied work by al-Sha?r?n?’s contemporary, the Meccan Sh?fi?? jurist Ibn ?ajar al-Haytam? (d. 974/1566), whose al-Fat?w? al-?ad?thiyya contains fat?w? that similarly sought to bridge the gap between ??fism and the law. However, while al-Sha?r?n?’s work is clearly aimed at potentially transgressive ??f?s, seeking to keep them within the fold of the law, Ibn ?ajar’s fat?w? aim to legitimize ??f? doctrines and scholars, particularly Ibn ?Arab? and Ibn al-F?ri?, in the eyes of the more conservative Meccan ?ulam??. His frequent citation of authorities recognized by the Meccan community as orthodox Sunn?s, such as the Meccan-Yemeni scholar-??f? ?Af?f al-D?n al-Y?fi?? (d. 768/1367), certainly belies his awareness of his environment. He cites these authorities to justify a number of controversial mystical doctrines in his day. Most importantly, he constrains the potential for ??f? transgression by not only attesting that kashf or ilh?m could never contradict the shar??a, but that knowledge gained through such supra-rational means cannot constitute a ??f?’s legal education. Rather, knowledge of the shar??a – its methods and rulings – can only be attained through instruction (ta?l?m). Because God never adopts an ignorant saint, the latter’s legal authority necessarily rests on his knowledge of the exoteric legal sciences, rather than his capacity for kashf and ilh?m. In sum, Ibn ?ajar’s fat?w? illustrate how widespread paradigms of belief in his day could be reconciled with those that came before, thus safeguarding both extra-textual and textual modes of authority.