The Berber customary law practiced in many Berber communities of North Africa prior to Independence has commonly been seen as disadvantageous to women relative to the norms of the Islamic fiqh used by their neighboring communities, whether Arabophone or Berberophone. Male privileging is particularly apparent in the areas of inheritance and divorce initiated by the wife. Exceptions to this generalization generally concern the Berber communities with matrilineal residues such as the Kel Tamasheq (Touregs). One important exception to this generalization is the institution of tighrad (literally ‘shoulders’ or ‘effort) also called tizla (‘racing about’) or in Arabic, al kad wa al sia`aya. Tighrad is the practice of dividing marital wealth--whether in the form of domestic expansion, agricultural bounty, or the creation of a business--upon divorce or death. This benefits both spouses and family members who contributed to the creation of wealth during the duration of the marriage. Tighrad as a legal institution originates and for a long time appears to have been unique to the Ishelhin of southwestern Morocco. Evidence of its application is clear in the dockets of the Berber customary courts created by the French in 1930 and used by hundreds of thousands of rural Berbers up until Independence in 1956 when King Mohamed V declared the customary courts defunct and left mountain communities without a legal system until Islamic qadis were appointed two years later. While little is known about what precisely justice looked like in this liminal mid-century period, oral histories suggest that Berbers continued to follow pre-Independence customs including tighrad. Today tighrad continues to be practiced in the Anti-Atlas mountains, sometimes overseen by rural notaries who authorize its application as legal by shared consent. The 2004 revised family code (muddawana) applicable to all Moroccans, Arab and Amazigh, introduced this Berber principle concerning “effort” into divorce proceedings, one of several reforms for greater gender equity both within marriage and upon its termination. Today, Moroccan first instance and appeals courts are deliberating the value of women’s work in home maintenance, improvements to property, agricultural labor for agriculturalists, and unrecognized efforts to expand husbands’ businesses in the case of the urban middle class. This paper analyzes this institution drawing on multiple sources: the original Berber customary court dockets; oral histories among Moroccan retired civil servants and Protectorate employees; and interviews with Anti-Atlas fuqaha and Moroccan judges, legal scholars, and lawyers deliberating these cases.