One explanation for the failure of the Oslo Peace Process points to the violent actions of extremists on both sides. In the wake of this violence, popular support for the peace process has waned, along with the willingness of the leaders on either side to push the process forward. But are the extremists alone to blame for Oslo’s death? This paper will argue that it is the peace-makers themselves who also share much of the blame. The paper represents the concluding chapter of a manuscript on the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process, and will bring together the findings in order to draw some lessons for future peace processes. In the manuscript I test the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: When there is an asymmetric distribution of power, moderates on the stronger side will take advantage of the asymmetry to promote their side’s interests. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates on the stronger side will attempt to keep their options open and will view the peace process as a test for the weaker side. Hypothesis 2: Due to their ambiguity vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates will continue to view the peace process as a zero-sum game. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates will try to wring maximal concessions from their adversary, while trying to minimize their own concessions, and they will be willing to countenance the breakdown of the negotiations in order to ensure that they get the best possible deal for themselves. Hypothesis 3: Due to their ambiguity vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates will be unable to fully commit to the peace process. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates will vacillate or oscillate between competitive and problem-solving approaches to the peace process; their support for the peace process will be based upon pragmatic considerations, rather than matters of principle; and they will be concerned about how their actions in pursuing peace will be interpreted by other members of society. Hypothesis 4: Due to their ambiguity vis-à-vis the peace process, the moderates will be unable to reconcile with their adversary. Sub-Hypotheses: The moderates will not change their views of the enemy, themselves, or their national myths or stories. This paper will begin with a discussion of the logic behind these hypotheses, and then discuss whether the Oslo experience supports or refutes them. Then, based upon these findings, the paper will conclude with a series of proposals for future peace processes to avoid the same fate as Oslo.